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Justice Michael A. Musmanno
and Obscenity (1956-1967)
Joel Fishman1
There was a time when juries and trial judges conscien-
tiously performing their duty in ascertaining the facts
were allowed to use their common sense and appreciation
of what is fair and just in deciding what is obscene and
what is not obscene. That day is vanishing like the
American Indian because recently courts have been fight-
ing windmills over the definition of the simplest words.
Any urchin on the street, any illiterate immigrant only in
America a few months, any uneducated laborer will tell
you the meaning of the word obscene, but there are courts
which still cannot define or describe obscenity without
employing polysyllabic words enmeshed in complicated
verbiage of unending modifications and nuances which
finally leave the reader or hearer as confused as one lis-
tening to an aboriginal incantation in an equatorial jun-
gle.'
From 1957 to 1973, the United States Supreme Court was en-
gaged in revising what was the contemporary view of obscenity.
The Court's opinion in Roth v. United States (1957) provided that
the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient inter-
est."3  It took another sixteen years, until Miller v. California
(1973), for the Court to articulate its three-prong test for obscen-
ity: "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole,
1. Joel Fishman, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison; Assistant Director for Law-
yer Services, Duquesne University Center for Legal Information/Allegheny County Law
Library, Pittsburgh, PA.
2. Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d 227, 243 (Pa. 1959) (Musmanno, J., dis-
senting).
3. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). For a contemporary commentary on this topic, see Tho-
mas B. Leary and J. Roger Noall, Note: Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law Offi-
cial and Unofficial Control of the Content and Distribution of Motion Pictures and Maga-
zines, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1957).
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appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value."
4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the United States
Supreme Court in a "lockstep" approach,5 supporting the expan-
sion of obscenity decisions dealing with both films and books. Be-
fore the Miller decision, Roth was considered the "standard" view
of how obscenity should be defined through court cases. In these
decisions, however, Associate Justice Michael A. Musmanno con-
sistently opposed the majority decisions and viewed obscenity or
pornography as a major problem for society. His quotation, cited
in the opening paragraph, reflects his views, as well as those of
others, on the subject. His decisions represent Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan's view of a single justice who votes his
conscience regardless of opinions of his brethren.6 This article will
review Justice Musmanno's decisions in film and book censorship
during the decade from 1956 to 1967.
I. FILM CENSORSHIP
Film censorship began in the early twentieth century when nu-
merous states created censorship boards to review films. In 1915,
Pennsylvania enacted the Movie Picture Censorship Act.7 Under
the act the formation of the Production Code Administration
stopped any further state action concerning censorship laws. In
1948, the United States Supreme Court decided in United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.' that motion pictures are entitled to
first-amendment protection. Four years later, the Court decided
Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson (1952) and determined that a New
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. Robert F. Williams uses this term, "Lockstep," to describe how state courts follow
policies based on federal, usually U.S. Supreme Court decisions, in deciding state opinions,
although state constitutional law may actually lead to other decisions. See Robert F. Wil-
liams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1984); Robert F. Williams, Methodology
Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1987).
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 427 (1985-1986).
A more recent article on the United States Supreme Court is Kevin M. Stack's The Practice
of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L. J. 2235 (1995-1996). For a recent commen-
tary on Brennan's lecture, see Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right"
to Dissent?, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 683 (1999).
7. 1915 PA. LAWS 534.
8. 72 S. Ct. 777 (1948).
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York film, Roberto Rossellini's The Miracle, could not be censored
under New York statutes, and that the word "sacrilegious" was too
vague.9 It is with this short background that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court heard its first censorship case in 1956, Hallmark
Productions v. Carroll (1956).1°
In this case, Hallmark Productions showed the film Wild Weed,
later renamed twice as Devil's Weed and then She Should'a Said
No!, in which the theme was a dope peddler selling marijuana
cigarettes to minors." In Pennsylvania, a Board of Censors found
the film "indecent and immoral and, in the judgment of the Board,
tended to debase and corrupt morals,' and therefore disapproved
it." The sole question for the court was whether the Censorship
Act
is unconstitutional, either because it is so vague and in-
definite in its terms as to offend the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, or because it abridges free-
dom of speech in contravention of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States and the free communication of thoughts and opin-
ions in violation of Article I, Section 7,131 of the Constitu-
9. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Richard Andress, Film Censor-
ship in New York State, at http://www.archives.nysed.gov/a/researchroom/
rr-film censor.shtml, (last viewed March 9, 2006); Film Censorship in the 21" Century, at
httpJ/www.stolaf.edu/depts/cis/wp/langes/censorship.html (last viewed March 9, 2006).
10. Hallmark Productions v. Carroll, 121 A.2d 584 (Pa. 1956).
11. The advertisement of the film stated: "An innocent girl takes a downward spiral
after she becomes hooked on marijuana." Available at http'//www.oldies.com/product-
view/5031D.html (last viewed March 9, 2006).
12. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 585.
13. 1874 PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 provided:
Freedom of the Press.
Section 7. The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake
to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government,
and no law shall ever by made to restrain the right thereof. The free communi-
cation of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and
every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsi-
ble for the abuse of that liberty. No conviction shall be had in any prosecution
for the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or men in
public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or infor-
mation, where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently
made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury; and in all indictments
for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under
the direction of the court, as in other cases.
Id. The provision was carried over in the article and section under the current 1968 Penn-
sylvania Constitution, at http'J/www.paconstitution.duq.edu/con68.html.
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tion of Pennsylvania.1 4
Citing first the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, and other state cases that followed the Burstyn case
in their own jurisdictions," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Censorship Statute, calling for "sacrilegious, obscene, in-
decent, or immoral, or such as tend, in the judgment of the board,
to debase or corrupt morals," was unconstitutional. 6
Chief Justice Bell provided a concurring opinion "reluctantly"
agreeing with the majority opinion based on the U.S. Supreme
Court opinions. A footnote observed:
If that standard is too vague and indefinite before the
motion picture is shown, it is difficult to understand how
a Court, can, after an exhibition, bar a picture or punish
its participants on the ground that it is obscene, indecent,
immoral or sacrilegious and hence a violation of Sections
527, 528 et seq. of the Criminal Code of June 24, 1939,
P.L. 872, 18 Pa.S. §§ 4527, 4528 et seq.17
This concurrence was followed by Justice Musmanno's dissent.
Associate Justice Musmanno opened his dissenting opinion with
an observation: "The Majority Opinion is an interesting legal
travelogue but it does not decide the issue in this case. It takes
the reader on a learned tour of various appellate courts but it does
not resolve the appeal before us."8 Rejecting the majority opinion,
he criticized the court for passing "sentence of execution on an
honorable institution which for forty-one years has protected the
good people of Pennsylvania from sacrilegious, obscene, indecent
and immoral pictures and those tending to debase or corrupt mor-
als." 9 The Board was a "dike" against indecency. He cited five
instances in the movie that were found unacceptable by the Cen-
sorship Board,2" that found no approval of the Federal Bureau of
14. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 585.
15. Id. at 586-87 (citing Gelling v. State of Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), Winters v. Peo-
ple of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), Superior Films, Inc., v. Department of Edu-
cation, Division of Film Censorship, 112 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ohio 1953), Commercial Pictures
Corporation v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 113 N.E.2d 502, 505
(N.Y. 1953)).
16. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 586-87.
17. Id. at 589 (Bell, C.J., concurring).
18. Id. at 590 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 591. Five of the 22 charges against the film listed by Justice Musmanno
were:
652 Vol. 44
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Narcotics for the film as an educational film,21 and that found no
support from the Censorship board and local police.22 Musmanno
criticized the majority for not discussing the film, while declaring
an act of the legislature unconstitutional:
But it is impossible to decide the constitutionality of the
Motion Picture Censorship Act without considering the
motion picture which brought the Act into the forum of
discussion. Statutes are not interpreted in a vacuum,
they are not weighed abstractly, they are not appraised
like a garment in a window - they must be draped over
the living figure of the controversy. This Court cannot
simply proclaim that a solemn Act of the sovereign body
of this Commonwealth, the General Assembly, is uncon-
stitutional. It must specify why. This it has not done."
Although finding the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in
Burstyn acceptable when it came to the question of a sacrilegious
film in New York, Justice Musmanno believed that the Court's
application should not apply to an obscenity film in Pennsylvania:
While conflicting currents of religious views might make
difficult the formation of a legal standard as to what con-
stitutes sacrilege in a motion picture, there can be no con-
8. The scene of two teenage couples, an open roadster on a hill overlooking
Hollywood and being under the influence of the drug; each boy having a girl in
his arms and smoking a marijuana cigarette depicts depravity and indecency
and is indecent and immoral and, in the judgment of the Board, tends to debase
and corrupt morals and teaches a method of crime.
10. The scene showing the party in Ann's home with Rita and the two men as
they smoke marijuana cigarettes and under its influence deport themselves in
an obscene manner is indecent and immoral and, in the judgment of the Board,
tends to debase and corrupt morals.
13. The scene showing Rita dancing in an indecent fashion under the influence
of the drug after smoking a marijuana cigarette is indecent and immoral and,
in the judgment of the Board, tends to debase and corrupt morals.
14. The statement made by the dope peddler (Markey) is indecent and immoral
and, in the judgment of the Board, tends to debase and corrupt morals, when
he says to the girl Ann "All that energy, beautiful-Let's not waste it in danc-
ing."
15. The scene where the dope peddler (Markey) and Ann leave the room where
the party has taken place and where Ann has already smoked her first mari-
juana cigarette and goes into another room with Markey is indecent and im-
moral and, in the judgment of the Board, tends to debase and corrupt morals.'
Id.
21. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 592 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 592-93.
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flict, in civilized society, as to what is indecent and im-
moral and what tends to debase and corrupt morals. The
code of decency and morality is one that God laid down in
the morning of creation and has been written on the tab-
lets of conscience of every race since the mists of Genesis
lifted, and man began to walk alone. '
Justice Musmanno went on to point out that the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that the opinion only dealt with the censorship of a
movie that was sacrilegious,25 as did Justice Reed's dissent claim-
ing the limited nature of the opinion." The Supreme Court's own
recognition that all motion pictures were open to the same criti-
cism of other forms of expression also drew his criticism that the
court would continue to strike down all films no matter how ob-
scene.2" He questioned the movement of lewd films from private
clubs to the public movie house: "How will the punishment of the
exhibitor heal the lacerating wounds made in the delicate sensa-
tions of children and sensitive adults who witness a picture of
lewdness, depravity and immorality? Damage is done at the very
first exhibition of the film."28 With upward of 4,000 people being
able to attend a movie theater in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia, the
opportunity to prevent showing had to be done before the movie
was shown not afterwards. "That is why reason dictates that con-
trol over immoral films must be found in prevention and not in
subsequent punishment."29
Furthermore, it was not enough to tell people that if they do not
like a film they should stay away:
How are people to know if a certain production is im-
moral and indecent? And why should anyone be required
to be offended in a theatre with scenes that sting decent
eyes and with language that shocks respectable ears? If
24. Id. at 593.
25. Id.
26. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 593-94. Justice Reed noted:
Assuming that a state may establish a system for the licensing of motion pic-
tures, an issue not foreclosed by the Court's opinion, our duty requires us to
examine the facts of the refusal of a license in each case to determine whether
the principles of the First Amendment have been honored. This film does not
seem to me to be of a character that the First Amendment permits a state to
exclude from public view.
Id. (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 506-07 (Reed, J., concurring)).
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one is to learn of impurities in water only after he has
drunk it, the municipal authorities have done very little
to protect the citizens who make up and maintain the
municipality. °
The government's police power to protect its citizens made it
possible to provide for the screening of movies: "Why should the
avenues of the mind and the soul be polluted with the parading of
indecencies and obscenities which can and do sometimes appear in
films?"31 In addition, the movie producers have their own code,
recognizing their own responsibility to the public in making
films."2 The Censorship Board, in 1953, "passed on 1144 subjects.
It rejected 10 pictures outrightly and in 34 others eliminated 84
scenes. Who can say that he has lost any of his freedom because
he was not given the opportunity to see the 10 bad pictures and
the 84 outlawed scenes?"33
Musmanno complained that the U.S. Supreme Court found the
word "sacrilegious" vague, but he saw nothing vague or uncertain
about the words "obscene," "indecent," and "immoral:"
There is nothing ambiguous about "debasement and cor-
ruption of morals." Any citizen with a fairly good educa-
tion, excellent character, good religious upbringing, social
consciousness and devotion to the ideals of democracy,
can pass with satisfactory results on whether certain mo-
tion pictures are moral and proper.'
He believed that the Censorship Board could only help people
and that the finding of a sacrilegious film did not take away from
the Board the capability of declaring something obscene. Citing
the Statutory Construction Act of 1937, he felt it provided for the
board "to pass upon pictures under the criteria of decency and mo-
rality."35 He asked, "Why then does the Majority outlaw the provi-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 595.
32. This is a reference to the Movie Picture Producers and Distributors of America
created in 1922 and created the Motion Picture Code in 1934 under William Hays. See
supra note 9, at Film Censorship in the 21" Century.
33. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 595 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 596.
35. Id. Musmanno cited 46 P.S. § 555:
The provisions of every law shall be severable. If any provision of a law is
found by a court of record to be unconstitutional and void, the remaining provi-
sions of the law shall, nevertheless, remain valid, unless the court finds the
valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected with,
Summer 2006 655
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sions of the Act which are constitutional?" 6 By removing the word
"sacrilege" from the act, the pertinent sentence would stand on its
own and could be enforced: "[The Board] shall disapprove such
[films] as are obscene, indecent, or immoral, or such as tend, in
the judgment of the board, to debase or corrupt morals."37 Mus-
manno concluded that:
The Pennsylvania Motion Picture Censorship Act is a for-
tress, armed originally with five cannon to protect the
welfare of the people from the forces of immorality and
intemperate greed. One of the cannon has been ruled out
of action. The other four remain whole and strong and
are in excellent firing condition. History has never shown
in America a surrender, while artillery of this formid-
ableness was fighting on the side of the right."
Three years later, Justice Musmanno again was faced with an
obscene movie, but this time it was being shown at a drive-in
theater.39 A defendant owner of a drive-in theater showed a film,
Undercover Girls, which was considered lewd and indecent and
was tried in Lackawanna Common Pleas Court under the Crimes
Code of 1939, section 528, which states:
Whoever gives or participates in, or being the owner of
any premises, or having control thereof, permits within or
on said premises, any dramatic, theatrical, operatic, or
vaudeville exhibition, or the exhibition of fixed or moving
pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent,
or immoral nature or character, or such as might tend to
corrupt morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor * * * ,o
and so depend upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed that the
Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the
void one; or unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing
alone, are incomplete or incapable of being executed in accordance with the leg-
islative intent.
36. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 595 (citing Rutenberg v. City of Philadelphia, 196 A. 73, 79
(Pa. 1938), to defend the constitutionality of the provision: "It is elementary that a statute
may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and in the event that the vari-
ous parts of the statute are independent of each other, that which is constitutional will
prevail and that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.").
37. Hallmark, 121 A.2d at 596-97 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 597.
39. Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1959).
40. Id. at 228 (citing 18 P.S. § 4528). The judge hearing the case determined:
Vol. 44656
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The majority opinion held that the United States Supreme
Court had found the word "sacrilegious" too vague in Burstyn v.
Wilson,41 while the terms "lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, and
immoral," and "tending to corrupt morals" were found unconstitu-
tional in Superior Films v. Department of Education of Ohio
(1954).42 Justice Musmanno opened his dissent in Blumenstein
with a comment on the Hallmark case:
[T]his Court dismantled the siege guns of the Motion Pic-
ture Censorship Act of 1915 which for 41 years had
stopped those invading forces at Pennsylvania's borders.
Now, there is nothing left with which to save clean-
minded, clean-thinking men, women and children of this
State from the vulgarities, obscenities and indecencies
which some moving picture producers are determined to
inflict on the public for the sake of a greed-soaked dol-
lar.43
In reference to the court's earlier statements that the criminal
code would protect society against obscene films, Justice Mus-
manno stated:
[I]t proclaimed has no reality at all. The signals which
were flown from the high masts turn out to be beguiling,
the lifesavers which were thrown to the public in 1956
turn out to be weighted with lead, the lifeline which was
lowered over the deck's rail has turned out to be only a
44thread which the decision of this Court today severs.
He felt that the court should have defended the criminal law
possibility in the 1956 Hallmark case so that the General Assem-
bly could have passed further legislation to protect society. In-
stead, "the Court threw to the public a weighted lifesaver, it low-
ered the parting strand of a lifeline, it hung out a chimerical rain-
The pictures depicted a series of dancing acts, which were definitely cheap,
lewd, obscene and indecent. By their very nature they would corrupt the mor-
als of the immature and the weak, appealing only to those of depraved taste
and the lowest of human instincts. To seek and entice dollars through the
promotion of lust and immorality manifests the worst kind of greed of money.
Blumenstein, 153 A.2d at 228.
41. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
42. 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
43. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d at 230 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 231.
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bow, it flashed an unreliable weather report, it removed the warn-
ing signs from the rocky shores."45 The safeguards that the state
had against obscenity were now being dismantled and were "as
useless as a stick against a striking jackal."46 Musmarno was
critical of the majority who claimed the statute was unconstitu-
tional without stating a rationale therefore.47 He went on to com-
plain:
I believe that the people of Pennsylvania who expect pro-
tection from obscene exhibitions, and who had every rea-
son to assume that it had that protection in the Criminal
Code, are entitled to be told why this Court strikes down
a law, whose prostrate form now leaves the district attor-
neys of the Commonwealth helpless to fight the purvey-
ors of cinematic filth.
48
In questioning the majority's opinion, he wondered how the major-
ity could declare something unconstitutional based on it being "ob-
scene." Reproducing the per curiam opinion of Hoimby Produc-
tions v. Vaughan,49 which cited to the Burstyn case to declare the
movie obscene, Justice Musmanno questioned how this comes to
define obscenity as unconstitutional in the Pennsylvania statute5 0
He continued to criticize his own court for ignoring previous
cases that held that "'all legislation must be construed as intend-
ing to favor the public interest.'"51
May this Court not presume that it is the intention of the
Legislature to favor the public which certainly wishes to
see young girls of 16, 15, and 12 protected from the deg-
radation of visual and auditory contact with an immoral
picture such as "Undercover Girls" has been proven to be?
Who can doubt that many juvenile delinquents have been
consciously or unconsciously urged into lurid crime be-
cause of being repeatedly exposed to lurid and immoral
motion pictures? Children are by nature imitative and
when they see immorality being practiced on so extensive
45. Id.
46. Id. at 232.
47. Id. at 234.
48. Blumensteinl 153 A.2d at 234 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
49. 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
50. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d at 234-35 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 236.
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and expansive a medium of expression as the motion pic-
ture screen, is it strange if they conclude that there is
nothing wrong about what is being publicly glorified?"
Movies such as Baby Doll were obscene to Justice Musmanno.
The lewdness of the film, the failure of the censorship board to
continue, and the court's decision resulted in "destroy[ing] the only
remaining protection we have had from cinema monstrosities,
there can be no doubt that there will come along other film de-
pravities which will make 'Baby Doll' seem like a Sunday School
travelogue in comparison."
Justice Musmanno contended that "[elven without statutes on
the subject, the exhibition of a picture which outrages public de-
cency is a crime." ' Judge Ervin of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court "spoke wisely, courageously, and eloquently on this subject
in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Randall:"5
Our Federal and State Constitutions assume that the
moral code which is part of God's order in this world, ex-
ists as the substance of society. The people of this State
have acted through their legislature on that assumption.
We have not so cast ourselves adrift from that code nor
are we so far gone in cynicism that the word "immoral"
has no meaning for us. Our- duty, as a court, is to uphold
and enforce the laws, not seek reasons for destroying
them.56
Justice Musmanno also defended his position on historical
grounds citing to the common-law case of Commonwealth v.
Sharpless,7 in which Justice Yeates found a person guilty for pos-
sessing an obscene painting that might corrupt peoples' morals.58
Current newspapers and periodicals - Time Magazine, Pitts-
burgh Post-Gazette, Philadelphia Inquirer - were quoted for their
various views against obscenity in the movies or the sale of porno-
52. Id. at 237.
53. Id.
54. He cited to 2 WM. L. CLARK AND WM. L. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIME § 8 (1900), which
was quoted in Commonwealth v. Schoen, 25 Pa. Super. 211, 217 (1904).
55. 133 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957).
56. Blumenstein, 153 A.2d at 238 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
57. 2S. & R. 91 (1815).
58. Blumenstein, 133 A.2d at 238-39 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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graphic movies through the mail. Whether looking at books or
movies, the result, according to Musmanno, is the same:
Moreover, motion pictures today are in effect talking pic-
torial books. In fact, most of the successful motion pic-
tures are based on books. Thus, whether youth is cor-
rupted by reading salacious books or by looking at sala-
cious motion pictures, the deleterious effect on the fibre of
the nation is the same.59
Musmanno concluded his dissent with an addendum, requesting
that the legislature read his opinion and future opinions in order
that the members would the necessary legislation to protect soci-
ety against obscenity. ° He believed the court had a responsibility
to the public to show why the unconstitutionality of the act af-
fected the prosecuting district attorneys "helpless to fight these
purveyors of cinematic filth."1
In the third movie-related case, Kingsley International Pictures
Corp. v. Blanc,62 the Corporation filed suit against Victor Blanc,
District Attorney of Philadelphia, who opposed the showing of the
movie And God Created Woman. Blanc previewed the film and
then informed the owners of the theaters that they would be ar-
rested under criminal law, 18 P.S. § 4528. In turn the theater
owners refused to show the movie, which was a breach of their
contract with the movie distributor. "[T]he sole question on this
appeal is whether, under the facts averred in the complaint, a
court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the District Attorney from
interfering with the exhibition of the motion picture films with
consequent irreparable harm to the property rights of the plain-
tiff."63 The court held that equity has jurisdiction because it is the
only way in which the plaintiff can gain relief.'
Under Pennsylvania law, section 4528 of title 18 made it a mis-
demeanor "to show . . .moving pictures, of a lascivious, sacrile-
59. Id. at 240.
60. Id. at 243.
61. Id.
62. 153 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1959).
63. Kingsley Corp., 153 A.2d at 246.
64. Id. at 246 (citing Bank of Virginia v. Adams, 1 Pars. 543, an early equity case de-
cided soon after equity jurisdiction was established by an 1836 statute; Adams v. City of
New Kensington, 55 A.2d 392 (Pa. 1947), which also supported equity jurisdiction in a
criminal case; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915), to uphold same principle that irreparable injury redounds unto the plaintiff
corporation which distributes and leases the film.).
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gious, obscene, indecent, or immoral nature and character, or such
as might tend to corrupt morals. "65
The Corporation filed its complaint on February 4, 1958, the day
before the film was to be shown, and the district attorney asked
for a preliminary injunction. The court held a hearing the next
day in which the "court suggested that the defendant agreed to the
film's being shown without interruption pending a determination
by the court with respect to the request for a preliminary injunc-
tion."" The film was shown on February 5, and a hearing took
place in which evidence of the harm suffered by the plaintiff was
introduced. A second hearing occurred five days later, and a dep-
uty city solicitor filed preliminary objections "which assigned, in-
ter alia, as ground for the dismissal of the bill, that equity is with-
out jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the complaint."
67
Between February 11 and March 5, 1958, the plaintiff obtained
orders restraining the district attorney from seizing the films,
which were then reversed on March 5. The district attorney again
seized the films. Thereafter the opinion summarizes cases from
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions in which equity is granted
when irreparable injury or harm will affect the plaintiff. The court
therefore reversed the lower court.68
Musmanno opened his dissenting opinion by reflecting on the
opinion declared in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, issued on the
same day, that found section 528 of the act of 1939 unconstitu-
tional. "If the defendants, who were indicted under the Act of
1939, cannot be prosecuted, why enjoin the District Attorney from
prosecuting them? The proposed injunction, as the law now
stands, is like enjoining a person from swimming in a river which
is empty of water."9 Justice Musmano further explained that, if
the injunction were granted against the district attorney, that
The costs should under no circumstances be placed on the
District Attorney. To do so, would be not only inequitable
but, as I view the case, contrary to the most elementary
rules of justice. To impose costs on a district attorney be-
cause of an injunction action begun by someone else-an
injunction which sought to impede the District Attorney
65. 18 P.S. § 4528.
66. Kingsley Corp., 153 A.2d at 245.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 248.
69. Id. at 249 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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in the discharge of his sworn duty-would represent to me
the ultimate in legal paradox and the apogee of jurispru-
dential outrage."
Justice Musmanno was harsh with his colleagues: "The Majority
completely ignores the rights of the public in this matter. The
public has the right to be protected from lewd, lascivious and im-
moral exhibitions."7' By telling the district attorney not to inter-
fere with the movie for over a year, he was restrained from per-
forming his duties as the law required of him. "And it is utterly
shocking that he should be restrained from protecting the rights of
the citizens of Philadelphia who elected him to do that very
thing." Furthermore, the court's sustaining of the lower court's
decision, Musmanno claimed, was "an extraordinary and, to me,
alarming doctrine, that a District Attorney may be enjoined from
proceeding in a criminal case."73 Citing Meadville Park Theatre
Corp. v. Mook74 for the position that it was the first time that such
a procedure had occurred, the court had transferred the violator
into the complainant and the district attorney into a defendant in
a civil action.75 Citing two U.S. Supreme Court cases in support of
his position that it was wrong to use equity to stop a criminal pro-
ceeding," Justice Musmanno further criticized the majority for
ignoring the rights of the public. "This Court makes not one refer-
ence to the public in its Opinion." " The court's failure to issue an
opinion in more than a year "allowed the public to be subjected to
the film's obnoxiousness for all that time, so that whatever rights
the public possessed to be guarded from obscenity and indecent
exhibitions have been completely dissipated, through no fault of
its own."78 In fact, he feared the movie could have been more than
obscene, it could have been pornographic, open to children and
women "left absolutely defenseless before its vulgar assaults on
public morals."79
70. Id.
71. Id. at 252.
72. Id. at 250.
73. Kingsley Corp., 153 A.2d at 250 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
74. 10 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. 1940).
75. Kingsley Corp., 153 A.2d at 251 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (citing Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925), and In re Saw-
yer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888)).
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Justice Musmanno reiterated his position that "[t]he rights of
property in a film certainly do not rise and should not rise higher
than the rights of the people to be protected from public corrup-
tion."" The defendant's request on April 8, 1958 to present an ap-
peal first gave the corporation the ability to show the film over a
period of time and earn all of the money it could. There was no
complication that needed to be tried in a court of equity, but in-
stead it could have been solved in the court of quarter sessions.
By analogy, Justice Musmanno questioned if someone possessed a
gambling device, could he stop prosecution because property rights
were involved?8  Since most criminal cases involve property
rights, equity proceedings "can then be protracted until witnesses
in the criminal case move away or die, documents are lost or dis-
appear and interest in the prosecution wanes, or disappears."82
Musmanno concluded his argument that the Hallmark, Bluemen-
stein, and now Kingsley cases had
devastatingly completed... the prosecution machinery of
the State in obscene films cases has been reduced to a
shambles. It is inevitable that the district attorneys and
the police departments throughout Pennsylvania will be
demoralized and bewildered as to what they can or
should do to keep out of the State the carpetbaggers of
filth, prevent the importation or (sic) pornography, and
restrain the merchants of obscenity. 3
He hoped the General Assembly would provide legislation to cor-
rect the situation, otherwise, the Commonwealth "may well be on
the way to a cinematic Gomorrah.'
Justice Musmanno's legislative request resulted in the General
Assembly, by a vote of 163 to 1 in the house, and 47 to 3 in the
senate, creating the Motion Picture Control Act of 1959.85 This act
was in place for two years before two cases came before the Penn-
80. Id. at 252.
81. Id. at 253.
82. Kingsley Corp., 153 A.2d at 253 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id. at 255.
85. 1959 PA. LAWS 902, 4 P.S. § 70.1 et seq.
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sylvania Supreme Court: William Goldman Theatres Inc. v.
Dana 6and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Boehm.8"
In Goldman Theatres, under the Motion Picture Control Act of
1959,88 Goldman Theatres sued to stop the Motion Picture Control
Board from enforcing the act, while in Twentieth Century, the
Corporation sued to stop the spending of money to enforce section
16 of the Act.89 The new Act followed the Roth prescription: a film
was obscene "if to the average person applying contemporary
community standards its dominant theme, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to prurient interest."" The court held that the Act was inva-
lid under Article I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as "a pre-
censorship of the exercise of the individual's right freely to com-
municate thoughts and opinions."91 Under Article I, §§6 and 9, the
theatres faced a panel appointed by the governor to determine if
the film was obscene, contrary to the "guarantee that a person can
be found guilty of a crime of the indicated description only if an
impartial jury of the vicinage is of the opinion that his utterance
was obscene. . . ,"" Another complaint by the court was that the
Board did not have to consider the film "as a whole," but could
"view" an individual frame separately." The court also questioned
if community standards were the same for people residing in both
city and rural area. Furthermore, the decision questioned
whether the members of the Board were capable of determining
standards when there were no qualifications, except residency, to
be appointed to the Board.9 The court's decision also questioned if
placing fees upon distributors was actually an impermisible tax
upon free speech.96 The act further limited importation of out-of-
state televisions and newspapers, as they were required to cut out
the proscribed films from their advertisements.97
86. 173 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1961). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consolidated the sepa-
rate appeals from the cases of William Goldman Theaters Inc. v. Dana and Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp. v. Boehm and disposed of them both in this opinion. Id.
87. Id.
88. 1959 PA. LAWS 902, 4 P.S. § 70.1 et seq.
89. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. 1961).
90. 1959 PA. LAWS 902.
91. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 64.
92. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 66.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 67.
97. Id. at 69.
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Justice Musmanno opened his dissent citing the Hallmark case,
which dissolved the Motion Picture Censorship Board, the Blu-
menstein case, which struck down the section of the criminal code
under which exhibitors of immoral pictures could be prosecuted,
and the Kingsley case, which ruled that a district attorney could
be enjoined from seizing a film which he regarded as violating the
laws of Pennsylvania because of obscenity.98 The ruling, he stated,
"reduces another statute of the sovereign body of the Common-
wealth to shreds of paper by declaring it unconstitutional."99 He
criticized the court's three decisions making "itself a super-chief
executive or a super-Senate.""' Musmanno faulted the court's re-
jection of the new act, for "freedom of speech is not involved in the
Act; much less freedom of the press."'
Musmanno doubted that motion picture regulation would lead
to press censorship:
The American people would never stand for press censor-
ship because the freedom of the press is one of the
strongest bulwarks of our independence and well-being
and has been so recognized by statutes and decisions of
the nation's highest court. Here we stand unanimously
as at Armageddon.'
He denied that the issues of freedom of speech and freedom of
press were really before the court. Performance of speech involves
only one person, while in motion pictures, many persons partici-
pate. Motion pictures go beyond communication and opinion,
since they "may appeal to the senses, to the passions. Further
comparison between mere words and the panorama, parade, and
performance of motion pictures is not only bizarre but might even
98. Id. at 79 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 80.
101. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 80 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). He quoted the para-
graph from Blumstein supporting the need of the state to protect children from the exami-
nation of visual and auditory contact with immoral exhibitions:
Who can doubt that many juvenile delinquents have been consciously or uncon-
sciously urged into lurid crime because of being repeatedly exposed to lurid and
immoral motion pictures? Children are by nature imitative and when they see
immorality being practiced on so extensive and expansive a medium of expres-
sion as the motion picture screen, is it strange if they conclude that there is
nothing wrong about what is being publicly glorified?
Blumstein, 153 A.2d at 27.
102. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 80 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
Summer 2006 665
Duquesne Law Review
become unseemly."10 3 The majority's discussion of the historical
nature of article I, section 7 of free press drew his question: "But
what does printing in 1790 to do with the malignance of filthy mo-
tion pictures?"10 4  Citing J. Edgar Hoover, columnist Bob Con-
sidine, Cardinal Cushing of Boston, John Wayne and others in
support of his view of immoral and obscene movies, Justice Mus-
manno applauded the creation of the act by the legislature "when
it decided that it had to do something to protect the children of
Pennsylvania from their corrosive influences."' 0 ' Musmanno
praised the state for its attempt to protect its citizens:
Pennsylvania has the right to pride itself on the solici-
tude it has always exerted in behalf of the welfare of chil-
dren. The statute books glow with special laws shielding
tender minds and bodies from inhuman treatment and
cruelty, injurious labor conditions, and deleterious envi-
ronments. Pennsylvania has enacted statutes to keep
children off the streets after certain hours, is prohibits
the sale of firearms to them. . . . The State budget each
year-bulges with expenditures running into millions and
millions of dollars, all designed to educate and protect
children, to promote their health - physical, mental,
moral and spiritual; to guide back to the path of moral
and legal behavior those who have strayed into the woods
and mire of delinquency.' 6
Musmanno further stated that it would take a book to describe
only briefly what Pennsylvania does to educate, train, and equip
the children of today to become the citizens of tomorrow to per-
petuate the ideals on which this Commonwealth was founded and
to which it has adhered in its entire glorious history.' He com-
plained that the legislature had provided instructions in a book on
how to protect children, but the court "tor[e] it [the instructions]
out, on the theory that it encroached on the rights of those en-
gaged in the business of this medium of entertainment, a medium
which unquestionably possesses the potentialities of pernicious
persuasion. " "'
103. Id. at 81.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 82.
106. Id.
107. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 82 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 82-83.
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The Act protects children, Musmanno claimed, while not inter-
fering with adult citizenry participating in a "perfectly legitimate
and in fact laudable business enterprise."0 ' He went on to claim
that the Act works in favor of the legitimate distributor "because
it is obvious that the vast majority of films submitted for registra-
tion will be approved for showing, and dealers will thus be saved
from a constant concern as to whether they may or may not be
violating the law of the State and the law of morals."' Following
the Supreme Court's definition, a person who is found to have an
obscene movie, would "only be paying what all citizens are re-
quired to pay in the maintenance of an organized, wholesome, and
decent society.""' Recognizing that free speech is limited if it in-
terferes with someone else's freedoms, Justice Musmanno ob-
served: "No one who is engaged in the business of motion pictures
has the right, under the Constitution, to contaminate the mind of
youth, just as no one, under the Constitutional guarantee of free
speech, has the right to slander or libel his neighbor.""'
Justice Musmanno further disagreed with the majority's holding
that prosecuting the defendant would result in a violation of the
constitutional provision of trial by jury under article I, section 6.
Other industries face the same problem when state inspections
that show tainted milk or meat or unhygienic barber shops that
violate statutory/administrative regulations, the offender has a
right to a jury trial after the government inspection, just as the
exhibitor of a motion picture. '
The majority opinion argued that if a picture was disapproved,
the exhibitor could not advertise its showing, and that would in-
fringe on right of free press and would keep national magazines
out of Pennsylvania. Justice Musmanno argued that it did not fol-
low because the Interstate Commerce clause of the Constitution
could not impede the introduction of papers into Pennsylvania."'
Nor did Justice Musmanno agree with the majority that the
members of the Control Board needed academic education or socio-
logical training. Rather, "[t]he reaction to a motion picture, in so
far as the reaction appertains to morality and decency, should be




112. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 82-83 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 84.
114. Id.
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trained in technical fields.""5 He did not think that the governor
would appoint an illiterate person to the board for "it is to ascribe
to the chief executive of the State an ignorance and sheer pever-
sity, which even the most partisan minded opponent would hardly
ever suggest.""' He agreed that the 1959 Act may need some im-
provements, but should not be considered unconstitutional.
In conclusion, Justice Musmanno praised the movie industry:
I regard motion picture entertainment as the best form of
relaxation extant. Color photography, the wide screen,
and the miraculous equipment which reproduces music
with such fidelity, volume and tone, that one can hardly
believe that the orchestra is not actually in the theatre-
all these magnificent features have made the motion pic-
ture theatre the rendezvous of relaxful diversion which
even kings could not have dreamed of having fifty years
ago. Classics in literature are being reproduced, educa-
tional subjects are attractively handled, history is made
to live again before one's entranced vision. Faraway
places, which the unwealthy person would never have the
money to visit, are being brought to us in all their origi-
nal charm, quaintness, and dramatic picturesqueness.1
7
He concluded by indicating his hope that the legislature would "in
the spirit of William Penn, try and try again" to supply movie pic-
ture control."8 The effects of the case were, however, contrary to
Justice Musmanno's wishes. The General Assembly never passed
another act for movie picture control.
II. BOOK CENSORSHIP
Turning to book censorship, at the end of the decade, Justice
Musmanno observed:
The contemporary United States Supreme Court has
drifted far from the wisdom and fundamental democratic
philosophy inherent in the above quotation. The Majority
Opinion in the case at bar seeks to justify its conclusions
citing from recent decisions of the Court on Capitol Hill
115. Id.
116. Id. at 85.
117. Goldman Theatres, 173 A.2d at 85 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
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in Washington. Those decisions are a lighthouse with
broken beams. The majority opinions of the present U.S.
Supreme Court, on the subject of obscenity, constitute a
never-never land of confusion and self-contradiction.
Taken in the aggregate, those opinions suggest a region
hazy with drifting fogs, beset with contrary wind cur-
rents, criss-crossed with labyrinthian, tortuous foot trails,
perforated with pitfalls and tortured with quicksands,
which no legal travelers could hope to traverse and
emerge therefrom with a precise knowledge as to where
he had been, what he had seen, and where he was now
going. It is with regret that I say this, but it is with con-
viction, based on intensive study of late Supreme Court
decisions, that I say that Court itself does not seem to
know where it is going on this subject which affects the
homes, the welfare, and the moral standards of the na-
tion. 1 9
Musmanno's most extensive, vituperative complaints against
pornography were reserved for the case dealing with Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer, a joint opinion issued for the cases of
Commonwealth v. Robin and Commonwealth v. Grove Press, Inc.2 °
Henry Miller authored the book in 1934, and it was banned in the
United States and Great Britain. 2' In 1961, Grove Press pub-
lished Cancer in the United States. A succession of cases followed.
Prior to the Pennsylvania case, the United States Supreme Court
held in Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein,'22 that the attempt to limit
publication of Tropic of Cancer amounted to an unconstitutional
abridgement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice
Cohen gave a short two paragraph opinion, citing four other states
(Connecticut, New York, Arizona, and Illinois) cases upholding the
federal decision against their own statutory law.' Following its
earlier holding in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that federal courts decisions were con-
119. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 233 A.2d 840, 861 (1967).
120. 218 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1966).
121. Jay Martin, "Miller, Henry," AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE Feb. 2000,
available at httpJ/www.anb.org/articles/16/16-02147.html (last viewed on March 5, 2006).
122. 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
123. Commonwealth v. Robin, 218 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1966). The four cases were State v.
Huntington, 204 A.2d 411 (Conn. 1964); Larkin v. G. P. Putman's Sons, 200 N.E.2d 760
(N.Y. 1964); State v. Locks, 397 P.2d 949 (Ariz. 1964); City of Chicago v. Kimmell, 201
N.E.2d 386 (Ill. 1964).
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clusive over state obscenity laws and therefore reversed the lower
court's decree.
24
Chief Justice Bell found Tropic a lewd, obscene book, but "reluc-
tantly concurs" that federal law mandated his accord. Both Jones
and O'Brien agreed with Bell. 2 ' Justice Roberts, however,
thought governmental action could take place in drawing restric-
tions on the sale or distribution of pornographic materials to juve-




Justice Musmanno's dissent was fourteen pages long.2 7  One
paragraph is usually cited to display his total opposition to this
work:
"Cancer" is not a book. It is a cesspool, an open sewer, a
pit of putrefaction, a slimy gathering of all that is rotten
in the debris of human depravity. And in the center of all
this waste and stench, besmearing himself with its foul-
est defilement, splashes, leaps, cavorts and wallows a bi-
furcated specimen that responds to the name of Henry
Miller. One wonders how the human species could have
produced so lecherous, blasphemous, disgusting and
amoral a human being as Henry Miller. One wonders
why he is received in polite society. 2 '
Musmanno called Henry Miller, "Moral Public Enemy No. 1, " 9
"a foul-minded pornographic writer," 3 a man "who shuns a bath
of clean words, as the devil avoids holy water, who reduces human
beings to animals, home standards to the pigsty, and dwells in a
land of his own fit only for lice, bedbugs, cockroaches and tape-
worms."
31
In regards to the U.S. Supreme Court holding that the "slightest
redeeming social importance" justified the publication, Justice
124. Robin, 218 A.2d at 546.
125. Id. (Bell, C.J., concurring; Justices Jones and O'Brien, joined in this concurring
opinion).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 547-61 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 556. This paragraph is cited in the American National Biography article on
him. Musmanno used the shortened form "Cancer" in referring to the book in his opinion,
and I will follow him.
129. Robin, 218 A.2d at 556 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 557 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Later, in Commonwealth v. Dell Publica-
tions, Inc., 233 A.2d 840, 862 (Pa. 1967), Musmanno called Miller "the arch pornographer of
America."
131. Robin, 218 A.2d at 556 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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Musmanno, opposed to the Roth holding, stated that if only hard-
core pornography fell within the obscenity, and left Cancer out,
than Cancer was "rotten-core pornography."132 Musmano cited Jo-
seph T. Kirkland of Union Baptist Church of Philadelphia and Dr.
Nicholas Fignitomedical director and chief psychiatrist of the
County Court of Philadelphia, as experts who called the book ob-
scene. 133 He went on to complain about "a tide of printed filth is
driving across the land" spreading everywhere.1 3 ' Again, he pos-
ited that "[slo far as youth and immature minds are concerned,
pornographic literature can do as much harm as narcotics. Of
course, no one dares to defend illicit traffic in narcotics but a thou-
sand tongues will wag to protect filthy books and magazines."'35
Harsh words were also applied to the book, Mein Kamp:
World War II which filled the universe with graves, crip-
ples, devastation and ruin, began with a book! Hitler's
Mein Kamp fired Germany with a bellicose spirit, a ha-
tred for minority and helpless peoples, and whipped the
nation into a global conflict which almost drove civiliza-
tion to the very brink of destruction, where indeed it even
teeters today. 36
Musmanno complained "[tihere can be no more false notion than
the one that the First Amendment protects everything that may
be utterly orally or in print."'37 Citing laws which prohibit false
advertising of food and drugs, he questioned,
why may law not protect children from poison which may
enter their minds, and do far more harm than any extra
grain of aspirin. The constant fare of dirty books, to the
exclusion of good literature, will eventually produce a
132. Id. at 552. He continued: "No decomposed apple falling apart because of its rotten
core could be more nauseating as an edible than 'Cancer' is sickening as food for the ordi-
nary mind. 'Cancer' is dirt for dirt's sake, or, more appropriately, as Justice Frankfurter
put it, dirt for money's sake." Id.
133. Id. at 550-51. Others cited included Dr. Benjamin Karpman, Chief Psychotherapist
at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, J. Edgar Hoover as head of the FBI, Ralph McGill, E. Preston,
Executive Director of Youth Study Center of Philadelphia. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 555-56.
136. Robin, 218 A.2d at 555-56 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 555.
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sick mind. The mind governs the body and if the mind
becomes sick, the body will become sick. 8'
The claim under the First Amendment clothed Cancer "with in-
vincibility," Justice Musmanno called it "arrant nuisance:"
It is the most bizarre notion imaginable that a printing
press constitutionalizes every paper that passes between
and beneath its rollers. Filth does not lose its stench or
its bubonic characteristics because it is formed into let-
ters of the alphabet. If everything that is printed or writ-
ten is presumed to be good and incapable of evil, then
correspondence on conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment, ransom notes or even counterfeit money could not
become the basis for prosecution of those who engage in
its dissemination or use."'
Of Grove Press, Justice Musmanno observed critically, "the
printing presses must now be corroded with the festering mildew
emanating from the accounts of human depravity."4 ' What Grove
Press calls "censorship of the erotic impulse" is the desire of the
American people to be liberated from the bubonic plague of morbid
unnatural emphasis on sex.
Musmanno felt pornography would undermine the social mores
of our society. Pornographic writing, "unless curbed by the law,
may eventually undermine the moral foundations of our nation
because they are aimed at the youths of today who eventually will
be the citizens of tomorrow.""' It would react negatively upon our
youth:
Abnormal sex and immorality are being hammered into
the minds of the youth of America with such shattering
influences and incessant repetition that it is displacing
from the thoughts of myriads of minors the concentration
due other vital facets of life. Devotion to country, ambi-
tion for wholesome careers, desire for approval in the
eyes of the community are being violently shouldered




141. Robin, 218 A.2d at 556 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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craving may well persuade youth into illicit behavior and
moral shipwreck.'42
Justice Musmanno's opposition to the majority opinion posited
against the U.S. Supreme Court precedents for this case. He cited
the U.S. Supreme Court justices who cited Jacobellis v. State of
Ohio4 3 as precedent for the Grove Press. He complained that the
Jacobellis case said absolutely nothing about Cancer, nor was it
about books but had to do with motion pictures.' After reviewing
the statements of the Justices, he did not understand his col-
leagues decision, stating "based on so varied a precedent is a mys-
tery to me."'45
Justice Musmanno claimed that the Gerstein case only reversed
the Florida Supreme Court. With no opinion filed by the court, he
found that "Gerstein is no authority for what may or may not be
done with "Cancer" in Pennsylvania."'46 He cited from Professor
Eugene Wambaugh's The Study of Cases and Henry Campbell
Black's Law of Judicial Precedents to support his view that the
"Supreme Court of the United States, in the Gerstein case, left the
door open as wide as the horizon for the State courts to determine
for themselves whether so loathsome a beast as 'Cancer' should
enter into the ark of the First Amendment protection."'47
He also found his colleagues' reliance upon Gerstein as "all con-
trolling, all powerful and all omniscient" was wrongly decided be-
cause they did not analyze Gerstein and Jacobellis cases but de-
pended on the four related state opinions.' None of the four cases
dealt with Cancer. The Huntingdon case dealt with an unnamed
publication; Chicago case dealt with two books; Arizona with
magazines; and New York dealt with Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure.'49
Various cases supported his view that freedom of speech is not
aboslute. He cited Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Scileppi's dis-
senting opinions in Putnam's Case,5° as well as other U.S. Su-
142. Id. at 557.
143. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
144. Robin, 218 A.2d at 557-58 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 558.
148. Id.
149. Robin, 218 A.2d at 559 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 559-60.
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preme Court cases supporting his position.T ' "It does not follow
that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every
motion picture of every kind at all times and places."5 ' In his con-
cluding paragraphs, he appealed to the long-honored standards of
American decency as part of our national heritage to the colonial
statesmen "who labored just as earnestly and valiantly, for moral
cleanliness as they did to destroy political tyranny."'53 Rather
than "Cancer's being consigned to the garbage can malodorously
yawning to receive it," it will go to the Public Library of Philadel-
phia "within ringing distance of Independence Hall where the Lib-
erty Bell rang out joyously the proclamation of the freedom, inde-
pendence and dignity of man."'54 His concluding paragraph read
"From Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, from Dan to Beersheba, and
from the ramparts of the Bible to Samuel Eliot Morison's Oxford
History of the American People, I dissent!"'55
Justice Musmanno's opposition to Cancer carried over in his
dissent in Commonwealth v. Dell Publications,'56 which upheld the
publication of the book Candy. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
conformed to Justice Brennan's position in the Roth case in ana-
lyzing the Candy decision.'57 The Court then reviewed Redrup v.
State of New York,"8 which involved two books and ten "girlie"
magazines, to show that the Court was divided.'59 Following the
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's finding that Candy was ob-
160scene.
Justice Musmanno began his dissent castigating the Supreme
Court decision in favor of Candy,' for which he "disassociate[d]"
151. He cited Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 81 (1961) (citing Gitlow v.
People of the State of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952)).
152. Robin, 218 A.2d at 559-60 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 561.
156. 233 A.2d 840 (Pa. 1967).
157. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications Inc., 233 A.2d 840, 843-44 (Pa. 1967).
158. 386 U.S. 767 (1966).
159. Dell Publications Inc., 233 A.2d at 852-53.
160. Id. at 854.
161. Id. at 858 (Musmanno, J., dissenting):
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had an opportunity in this case to unlim-
ber some heavy artillery in fighting for American morality; it had unlimited
freedom to pour devastating fire into the forces that would destroy the very
foundations of decency, purity and wholesome conduct upon which our Ameri-
can society is founded; it had the clearest chance to draw from the armory of
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from the case, "intellectually, jurisprudentially, and philosophi-
cally from the decision of this Court in this case."62
To the majority opinion claiming its opinion should not be con-
strued as approval of Candy, Musmanno questioned "How else can
it be construed? The Majority's statement is like saying the Court
does not approve of a snake entering a nursery but forbids anyone
to build a fence around the nursery to keep the snake out."6 ' He
denied the "healthy" aspects of the book which would "make the
beasts of Sodom and Gomorrah ashamed""u or that it was a satire
upon our contemporary society that represents the "reprehensible
conduct, the bestial practices described in Candy."'65
Justice Musmanno's condemnation of the U.S. Supreme Court,
as stated above,'66 was shown by his quoting the majority opinion
concerning the divisions of the justices. 67  'The decisions are a
conglomeration of personal views, individual tangents and private
predilections, without much thought apparently being given to the
the law the weapons which would beat back those who, for greed and lucre,
would poison the minds of the youth of our Commonwealth. The Supreme
Court, however, did none of these things. The Majority of this Court retired
from the field of battle without firing a shot. It did more. It encouraged the
foul foe to smash more effectively at the bastions of American decency; it un-
furled a flag of impeccability and authority over the invading filthy battalions;
it supplied to each hoodlum in the putrid expeditionary force a bar of Ivory




164. Dell Publications Inc., 233 A.2d at 859 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (italics added).
166. Id. See supra note 119.
167. Dell Publications, Inc., 233 A.2d at 861-62 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Justice
Musmanno wrote:
Because of the wide difference of opinion on the Supreme Court, perhaps the
only way to obtain a sense for the Court's attitude qua Court is to consider the
views of each individual Justice. A breakdown of the individual votes in the
eleven Redrup related cases reveals the following: Justices Black, Douglas and
Stewart predictably voted to reverse in each instance, but so did Justices White
and Fortas. Justice Brennan voted to reverse the conviction in seven cases, to
affirm two cases (both involving movies) Without giving any reason, and to af-
firm one case on the authority of Ginzburg and to vacate and remand one case
on the authority of Memoirs. Chief Justice Warren voted to reverse in two
cases, to affirm in two cases (both involving movies) Without giving any reason,
to affirm two cases on the authority of Mishkin and one on the authority of
Ginzburg, to vacate and remand one case in light of Memoirs, and to set down
three cases for oral argument. Justice Clark voted to reverse in two cases, to
affirm in five cases Without giving his reasons, to affirm two cases on the au-
thority of Mishkin and one on the authority of Ginzburg and to set down one
case for oral argument ....
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effect those decisions will have on the nation as a whole."168 Mus-
manno further opined that the fourteen opinions handed down in
three cases could be overlooked if they "resulted only in verbal
confusion, one could overlook shall study, nebulous syntax, vo-
cabular circulocution and indifference to stare decisis, but the
tragedy is that, with confusion at the sentinel gate, the porno-
graphic thieves steal into the citadel of our moral security."169 The
actions of the U.S. Supreme Court are "in effect, to offer in one
form or another, a free passport to every book which comes before
it, no matter how degraded or vile it may be." 7° Quoting from the
early case of Mugler v. State of Kansas,"7' he posited that the Su-
preme Court acknowledged it was the legislative function in its
police power to guard public morality; however, he criticized the
Supreme Court for its assumption of jurisdiction over "millions of
books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers in the land, a juris-
diction it cannot possibly cope with."' 2 The court's "seizure of ju-
risdiction," from the local state's judge's point of view,
has worked, and continues to work, havoc in the individ-
ual states which are frequently compelled to wait for de-
cisions from Washington as to whether a book may or
may not be sold at a newsstand in a village in North Da-
kota. And more often than not, the expected decision
turns out to be so cloudy in exposition and disposition
that the pornographic culprit escapes under cover of rhe-
torical smoke. "3
His own court's failure to contradict the federal court "sawed
away the rights of the people of Pennsylvania to be saved from the
innundation of filth gushing from the pages of a book which the
Majority finds possesses a minimum of social importance but
never explains why. But, of course, it cannot!"'74
168. Id. at 862.
169. Id. Here he is referring to the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court opinions in Mishkin v.
State of New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), and
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of
Com. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
170. Dell Publications Inc., 233 A.2d at 863 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
171. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
172. Dell Publications Inc., 233 A.2d at 863 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 864.
174. Id. at 865.
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III. OTHER RELATED CASES
Two other opinions were handed down by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court that tangentially dealt with obscenity issues, but
were decided on other rationales. Justice Musmanno participated
in the decisions, but did not write the majority opinion nor did he
offer concurring or dissenting opinions. In In re Tahiti Bar,'75 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a criminal statute against
two bars (Casino Bar and Tahiti Bar) for liquor code violations
rather than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights dealing with
freedom of expression and due process. 7 ' The emphasis upon the
police power of the state to regulate alcoholic beverages completely
interfere with freedom of expression or speech.'77 Musmanno's ap-
proval of this act probably falls under two categories. For decades
he hated drunk driving and consistently opposed excessive drink-
ing.178 Furthermore, since the court did not argue that it was an
infringement on a constitutional freedom or upholding an obscene
or immoral act, there was no need for a concurrence or dissent.
In Cooper v. McDermott 79 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs had violated Pennsylvania criminal statutes8 °
in the distribution and printing of obscene literature.18" ' The
Philadelphia district attorney asked the Governor to request ex-
tradition of the individuals from California to be held on trial.82
The suit was brought by six individuals involved with the criminal
charges and three taxpayers who objected to the district attorney's
use of extradition warrants as a waste of tax funds if further
prosecution occurred."8 The lower court denied injunctive relief
175. 150 A.2d 112 (Pa. 1959).
176. In re Tahiti Bar, 150 A.2d at 115. Section 493 (47 P.S. § 4-493) provides in material
part that it shall be unlawful
for any licensee, under any circumstances, to permit in any licensed premises
any lewd, immoral or improper entertainment, regardless of whether a permit
to provide entertainment [required by this section] has been obtained or
not * * *. Any violation of this clause shall . . . subject the licensee to suspen-
sion or revocation of his permit and his license.
47 P.S. § 4-493 (emphasis added to original).
177. In re Tahiti Bar, 150 A.2d at 116, 120-21.
178. As a judge of the court of common pleas of Allegheny County, Musmanno found
people guilty of drunk driving and sentenced them to the workhouse or jail depending on
the severity of their conduct.
179. 159 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1960)
180. 1939 PA. LAWS 872, section 524 as amended by 1957 PA. LAWS 972, 18 P.S. § 4524.
181. McDermott, 159 A.2d at 487.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 488.
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and dismissed the request for a preliminary injunction.'" The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the lower court.'85 It rejected
the criminal charges finding it possible for the accused to question
the constitutionality of the criminal law procedures in a regular
trial. '8 The court also rejected the argument that equity has no
jurisdiction in the matter of these crimes by creating irreparable
damage done to property.8 7 Furthermore, the court found it pos-
sible to uphold the lower court decision that the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, 19 P.S. § 191.1 et seq., "provide[d] for the extradi-
tion of persons whose acts in the asylum state result in the com-
mission of crimes in the demanding state."'88 Both Justices Bell
and Bok dissented, though only the former offered a lengthy dis-
sent. Justice Musmanno's decision to support the majority opinion
reflects his noncombative approach in this matter that would
bring violators of the law to court. Since Chief Justice Bell's dis-
sent found that equity did apply in determining a legal right and
was against bringing the violators back to Pennsylvania for trial,
he thought the offenders could be tried in California either on
state laws or in the federal courts if they violated the federal
postal laws.'89
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Michael A. Musmanno's dissents in these major cases
dealing with film and book obscenity were consistent throughout
the decade. Beginning with Hallmark and finishing with Dell
Publications, he struggled against U.S. Supreme Court opinions
that widened the definition of obscenity, lewdness, and immorality
that opened the door for expanding growth of all types of materials
throughout society. His approach to protect society, especially
younger adults and children, reflect his views on American democ-
racy. He had no problem in criticizing the justices on the U.S. Su-
preme Court and his own judicial colleagues for their opinions. In
his early opinions he urged the legislature, as a coordinate branch
of government, to do more in limiting the spread of pornography.
Yet, the court overruled the two attempts by the legislature to
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. McDermott, 159 A.2d at 489.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 494-95.
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limit the spread of obscene materials. As the one, sometimes two,
dissenting judges in these opinions, Justice Musmanno's views
never wavered. The growth of pornography through books, mov-
ies, and even television today would probably have Justice Mus-
manno turning over in his grave when viewing how widespread
pornography is with little restrictions offered by the courts.19 °
190. See United States v. Extreme Associates, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
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